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We study the effects of pension reform in a four-period OLG model for an open economy where 
hours worked by three active generations, education of the young, the retirement decision of older 
workers,  and  aggregate  per  capita  growth,  are  endogenous.  Next  to  the  characteristics  of  the 
pension system, our model assigns an important role to the composition of fiscal policy. We find that 
the model explains the facts remarkably well for many OECD countries. 
Our  simulation  results  prefer  an  intelligent  pay-as-you-go  pension  system  above  a  fully-funded 
private  system.  When  it  comes to  promoting  employment,  human  capital,  growth,  and  welfare, 
positive effects in a PAYG system are the strongest when it includes a tight link between individual 
labor income (and contributions) and the pension, and when it attaches a high weight to labor 
income earned as an older worker to compute the pension assessment base.  
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1. Introduction 
Concern for the long-run financial viability of public pension systems has put pension reform high on 
the agenda of policy makers and researchers. The past two decades have seen a wave of reforms in 
many countries (Whitehouse et al., 2009). At the same time the literature on pension economics has 
grown rapidly (see e.g. Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Fenge and Pestieau, 2005; Barr, 2006; and many 
recent papers that we refer to below).  
To  face  the  pension  challenge,  there  seems  to  be  general  agreement  on  the  need  for  higher 
employment, especially among older individuals, and higher productivity growth. Many studies have 
documented how the pension system may affect the incentives of individuals of different ages to 
work (e.g. Auerbach et al., 1989; Gruber and Wise, 2002; Cremer et al., 2008; Sánchez Martín, 2010; 
Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010; Jaag et al., 2010; de la Croix et al., 
2010). Others have investigated the relationship between the pension system and investment in 
human capital formation, as a major determinant of productivity growth (e.g. Zhang, 1995; Kemnitz 
and Wigger, 2000; Docquier and Paddison, 2003; Zhang and Zhang, 2003; Kaganovich and Meier, 
2008; Hachon, 2010; Le Garrec, 2011). Still others have demonstrated the crucial role of human 
capital formation to counteract the negative effects of population ageing on per capita output (e.g. 
Docquier and Michel, 1999; Fougère et al., 2009; Ludwig et al., 2010). Consensus on what pension 
reform would serve the goals of higher employment, productivity growth, and welfare best, has 
however not been reached. The results in some papers support parametric adjustments in the pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) system that most countries rely on. Other papers prefer a gradual move to an 
actuarially neutral fully-funded private system. Often, differences in the particular specification of 
the model economy that is used for the analysis may explain the differences in results. 
In this paper we construct and parameterize a general equilibrium four-period OLG model for an 
open  economy.  The model  explains  hours of work  of young, middle-aged  and  older  individuals, 
education  and  human  capital  formation  of  the  young,  the  retirement  decision  of  the  older 
generation, and aggregate per capita growth. It includes a public PAYG old-age pension system which 
pays out pensions to a fourth generation of retired. The statutory retirement age in our model is 65 
and  exogenous.  Old-age  pensions  are  paid  from  this  age  onwards.  Individuals,  however,  may 
optimally choose a lower effective (early) retirement age. The government in the model sets tax 
rates on labor, capital and consumption. It allocates its revenue to productive expenditures (mainly 
for education), consumption, ‘non-employment’ benefits (including early retirement benefits) and 
old-age pension benefits. Our aim is to investigate the effects of various parametric adjustments in 
the early retirement regime and in the old-age PAYG pension system. These parametric adjustments 
include changes in benefit levels, changes in the link between benefits and individual contributions, 
and changes in the weights of the three active periods in the computation of the old-age pension 
assessment base, i.e. earned labor income used to calculate pension benefits. We also consider the 
effects of moving to full private capital funding.    
Our main contribution in this paper is to study the impact of pension systems on employment by age, 
the  effective  retirement  decision, education  and  growth,  and  the welfare  of  current  and  future 
generations within one coherent framework, where all these variables are endogenous. Here we 
differ from the existing literature. The above mentioned studies either investigate incentives to work 
in a model with exogenous human capital and growth, or investigate human capital and growth while   3 
ignoring the labor-leisure choice and the endogeneity of labor supply
1. Our approach allows to fully 
take into account the mutual relationships between all variables, which will matter for the size and 
possibly the direction of policy effects. Various channels exist in our model whereby the effects of 
changes  in  employment  and  changes  in  capital  formation  reinforce  each  other.  For  example,  if 
employment rises, so will the marginal productivity of physical capital and the incentive to invest. 
Also, if people postpone retirement and work longer, the return to investment in education will rise, 
and so may human capital and growth. Conversely, policies that promote education will encourage 
people to work longer since they will then get a higher return from their investment. Our model also 
contains channels where employment and growth will move in opposite directions. One channel 
follows from the possible tradeoff between employment of the young and education. Pension reform 
which discourages employment of the young may still be positive if this contributes to education and 
growth. As we show in this paper, the final effects of pension reform depend on all these interactions. 
It will be important to have a realistic estimate of key parameters, for example in the specification of 
the human capital production function, or in labor supply by age.   
Next to the endogeneity of all key variables, our model contains a number of other features 
which matter for the analysis of the effects of pension reform, but which are often ignored in the 
literature.  The  most  important  of  these  is  a  realistic  modeling  of  the  transition  from  work  to 
retirement, and the role of early retirement regimes. These regimes play an important role in many 
countries. We explicitly distinguish the effective (early) retirement age, which is optimally chosen, 
and the statutory retirement age, which is exogenous (see also Heijdra and Romp, 2009; de la Croix 
et al., 2010). Old-age pensions in our model are paid only from the statutory retirement age onwards. 
A key implication is that old-age pensions do not directly raise the opportunity cost of working in our 
model. Early retirement benefits do. In the literature this distinction is often not made (e.g. Hu, 1979; 
Börsch-Supan et al., 2006; Jaag et al., 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010). It may obviously affect the 
evaluation of old-age pension reform. As a second feature, we allow individual pension benefits in 
the PAYG system to depend on accumulated individual labor income and contributions, rather than 
on average per capita labor income. Many countries  have initiated reforms that strengthen this 
individual contributions - benefit link. Lindbeck and Persson (2003), Zhang and Zhang (2003) and Jaag 
et al. (2010) demonstrate the importance of taking this link into account. Others however ignore it 
when modeling a PAYG system, which may overstate the distortion induced by this system (e.g. 
Börsch-Supan  and  Ludwig,  2010;  Ludwig  et  al.,  2010)
2.  Another  characteristic  which  affects  our 
results, is the assumption of an open economy. It has been shown that pension reform may have 
profound effects on international capital flows (e.g. Börsch-Supan et al., 2006). In an open economy, 
changes in national savings need not feed through into investment in the domestic economy. Factor 
price changes may be much weaker than presumed in closed economy models. Clearly, this may 
affect employment and human capital formation. As a final feature, we assume that demography and 
population are constant in our model. Although ageing is obviously a crucial factor behind pension 
reform in many countries, this assumption need not be a limitation to disentangle behavioral effects 
from pension reform (see also Jaag et al., 2010; Fisher and Keuschnigg, 2010).  
 
                                                           
1 Fougère et al. (2009) and Ludwig et al. (2010) also develop a model with endogenous employment by age and  
human capital, but they have exogenous growth. Moreover, Fougère et al. (2009) do not study pension reform. 
2 Long ago, Sheshinski (1978) already showed in a model that a pension system can encourage work and late 
retirement if benefits increase in the retirement date. This idea has been picked up also by Gruber and Wise 
(2002).      4 
To study the effects of pension reform we parameterize, numerically solve, and simulate our model.  
Before we do that, however, we test its empirical validity for a group of 13 OECD countries. The 
countries that we consider include the US, the core countries of the euro area, the UK, Canada and 
the Nordic countries. Our main motivation for this test goes back to Stokey and Rebelo (1995), who 
find extreme variation in the predictions of existing calibrated models investigating the effects of 
public policy in the literature.  Before using a parameterized theoretical model for policy simulations, 
we would therefore like to get at least some minimal evidence that the model’s predictions are 
within reliable bands. Our procedure is as follows. We impose common technology and preference 
parameters  on  all  countries,  but  country-specific  fiscal  policy  and  pension  system  parameters. 
Simulating the model for each country we find that its predictions match the main facts in most 
countries. These facts concern observed hours of work in three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64), 
education of the young (20-34), the effective retirement age, and per capita growth since 1995. We 
conclude that the model translates observable policy differences into performance differences which 
are roughly in line with observations in the data. 
Having  established  its  empirical  reliability,  we  then  use  the  model  for  policy  simulations.  Our 
simulations  assess  to  what  extent  pension  reform  may  contribute  to  employment,  growth  and 
welfare. Our results speak in favor of an intelligent PAYG system. This system contains a close link 
between  old-age  pensions  and  individual  labor  earnings  and  contributions  via  a  high  pension 
replacement rate. Even more important is a high weight of labor income (i.e. hours worked and 
human capital) earned as an older worker in the pension assessment base. Pension reform in this 
direction encourages young individuals to study and build human capital, which promotes long-run 
growth. Furthermore, it encourages older workers to postpone retirement. Strengthening the link 
between one’s future old-age pension, on the one hand, and one’s human capital and labor supply 
when older, on the other, introduces strong financial incentives which may bring about important 
changes in behavior. Positive effects on employment, the effective retirement age, and growth, raise 
the government’s resources, which makes it possible to finance a larger pension burden. Our results 
prefer a reform of the PAYG system along these lines above a movement to a fully funded private 
system,  both  from  the  perspective  of  employment,  growth  and  welfare.  We  demonstrate  the 
importance of the particular characteristics in our model that we have emphasized above. Finally, 
whereas our results show that old-age pension benefits may rise in an intelligent PAYG system, early 
retirement benefits must be reduced.   
This paper confirms that the pension system can be a valuable policy instrument in its own right, as 
recently emphasized also by Cigno (2010). When it comes to employment, our results are in line with 
arguments for a change of the rules in actuarial direction as explained by Gruber and Wise (2002), 
Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Cigno (2010) among others. Furthermore, our results demonstrate 
the importance of also taking into account possible effects on education, human capital and growth.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we document differences in employment by age, 
education  of  the  young,  the  effective  retirement  age,  and  per  capita  growth  across  13  OECD 
countries since 1995. Section 3 sets out our model. In Section 4 we calibrate the model on actual 
data and confront its predictions with the facts described in Section 2. Section 5 includes the results 
of a range of model simulations. We investigate the steady state effects of various reforms of the 
pension system. We also study transitional dynamics, and the welfare effects per generation. Section 
6 concludes the paper.     5 
2. Cross-country differences in employment by age, tertiary education and per capita growth 
Table 1 contains key data on employment, education and growth in 13 OECD countries in 1995-2007. 
One would like a reliable model to match the main cross-country differences reported here. The 
employment rate in hours (n) indicates the fraction of potential hours that are actually being worked 
by the average person in one of three age groups (20-34, 35-49, 50-64). Potential hours are 2080 per 
person per year (52 weeks times 40 hours per week). The observed employment rate rises if more 
people in an age group have a job, and if the employed work more hours. The employment rate in 
the age group of 50 to 64 is also affected by the average age at which older workers withdraw from 
the labor force. We also include the effective retirement age in Table 1. In most countries, this age is 
well below the official age to receive old-age pensions (65 in most countries, 60 in France). The 
education rate (e) is our proxy for the fraction of time spent studying by the average person of age 
20-34. It has been calculated as the total number of students in full-time equivalents, divided by total 
population in this age group. Our data for (average annual) real  per  capita  growth  concern  real 
potential  GDP  per  person  of  working  age.  We  refer  to  Appendix  1  for  further  details  on  the 
calculation of all our data, and on the assumptions that we have to make. 
 
 
Table 1  
Employment rate in hours (n), effective retirement age, education rate (e) and per capita growth in 














Annual real per 
capita growth 
             
Austria  59.9  64.3  34.7  59.5  12.5  2.06 
Belgium  51.1  56.8  29.3  57.9  14.1  1.77 
France  48.7  60.3  38.0  58.8  14.9  1.54 
Germany  49.7  55.2  34.9  61.1  17.2  1.56 
Italy  50.1  61.9  33.8  60.1  12.6  1.30 
Netherlands  50.8  54.6  34.2  60.0  14.7  2.20 
Core euro area 
Average 
 
51.7  58.8  34.2  59.6  14.3  1.74 
Denmark  56.2  66.7  49.6  62.2  21.7  1.81 
Finland  55.6  69.0  47.3  60.2  23.1  2.72 
Norway  51.9  60.9  50.6  63.1  18.1  2.29 




54.3  65.6  50.7  62.2  20.2  2.25 
US  65.6  74.2  59.6  64.2  12.8  1.54 
             
UK  60.8  68.4  49.4  62.0  12.3  2.13 
Canada  60.9  69.5  50.4  62.1  13.6  1.68 
             
All country 
average 
55.0  63.7  43.6  61.1 
 
15.8  1.91 
       
Data  sources:  OECD  (see  Appendix  1);  data  description:  see  main  text  and  Appendix  1.  The  data  for 
employment and growth concern 1995-2007, those for education 1995-2006. The effective retirement age is 
an average for 1995-2006. All data are in percent, except the retirement age.   6 
As  is  well-known,  middle-aged  individuals  work  most  hours,  followed  by  the  young.  The  older 
generation works the lowest number of hours. Average employment rates over all countries in these 
three age groups are 55.0%, 63.7% and 43.6% respectively. Furthermore, the data reveal strong 
cross-country differences. We observe the highest employment rates in each age group in the US. 
Employment rates are much lower in the core countries of the euro area. The Nordic countries take 
intermediate positions, although they are close to the core euro area for the younger generation. 
The latter, however, seems to be related to education. Young people’s participation in education is 
by far the highest in the Nordic countries. These countries also show the highest potential per capita 
growth rates. On average, growth in the core euro area and the US was more than 0.5 percentage 
points lower in the period under consideration. The US and the other Anglo-Saxon countries tend to 
have the lowest participation in education among people of age 20 to 34. Finally, we note that the 
effective retirement age also varies across countries. The retirement age is quite low in Belgium (57.9) 
and France (58.8). By contrast, individuals in Nordic or Anglo-Saxon countries participate longer. 
Unsurprisingly, correlation between the effective retirement age and the employment rate among 
older workers (n3) is very high (0.89).   
 
3. The model 
Our  analytical  framework  consists  of  a  computable  four-period  OLG  model  for  a  small  open 
economy. We  assume  perfect  international  mobility  of  physical  capital  but  immobile  labor  and 
human capital. Seminal work in the OLG tradition has been done by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond 
(1965). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) initiated the study of public finance shocks in a computable 
OLG  model.  Buiter  and  Kletzer  (1993)  developed  an  open  economy  version  of  the  model  with 
endogenous growth, putting human capital at the centre. As we have documented in Section 1, a 
huge literature has used OLG models to study the behavioral effects of the pension system, either on 
employment, assuming exogenous growth, or on human capital and growth, assuming exogenous 
employment.  New  in  our  model  is  that employment  by  age,  education  and  human  capital,  and 
growth, are jointly endogenous. 
We consider three active adult generations, the young, the middle-aged and the older, and one 
generation  of  retired  agents.  All  generations  are  of  equal  size,  normalized  to  1.  Population  is 
constant. Within each generation agents are homogeneous. Individuals enter the model at age 20. 
Each period is modeled to last for 15 years. Young people can choose either to work and generate 
labor income, to study and build human capital, or to devote time to ‘leisure’ (including other non-
market activities). Middle-aged and older workers do not study anymore, they only work or have 
‘leisure’. The statutory old-age retirement age is 65. Individuals may however optimally choose to 
leave the labor force sooner in a regime of early retirement. Domestic firms act competitively and 
employ physical capital together with existing technology and effective labor provided by the three 
active generations. A final important assumption is that education generates a positive externality in 
the sense of Azariadis and Drazen (1990). The average level of human capital of a middle-aged 
generation is inherited by the next young generation. 
In what follows, we concentrate on the core elements of the model: the optimizing behavior of 
individuals,  the  production  of  effective  human  capital,  the  behavior  of  domestic  firms  and  the 
determination of aggregate output and growth, capital and wages.    
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Lifetime  utility  (1)  depends  on  consumption  (cj)  and  enjoyed  ‘leisure’  (ℓj)  in  each  period  of  life.  
Superscript t indicates the period of youth, when the individual comes into the model. Subscript j 
refers to the jth period of life. Furthermore, b  is the discount factor (0<b<1). The intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption is 1, the intertemporal elasticity to substitute leisure 1/q. 
Finally, g specifies the relative value of ‘leisure’ versus consumption. Note that g may be different in 
each period of life. Except for the latter assumption, our specification of the instantaneous utility 
function is quite common in the macro literature (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Rogerson, 2007).  
 
Figure 1 shows the life-cycle of an individual reaching age 20 in t. Individuals choose time devoted to 
work (nj) in the three active periods and education time (e1) when young. Since individuals only 
allocate  time  to  education  in  their  first  period,  we  drop  the  subscript  1  in  what  follows.  Time 
endowment is normalized to 1 in each period. The determination of early retirement is part of 
individuals’ optimal choice of ‘leisure’ time in the third period of life (50-65). Individuals choose R 
which relates to the optimal effective retirement age and which is defined as the fraction of time 
between age 50 and 65 that the individual participates in the labor market; (1-R) is then time in early 
retirement. We use n3 to denote the fraction of time devoted to work between 50 and 65, and      as 
the fraction of time devoted to work before early retirement, but after 50. As labor market exit is 
irreversible and post-retirement employment is not allowed in our model, the relationship between 
n3 and      is as follows: n3 =  .    . 
               In the first two periods of active life, ‘leisure’ falls in labor supply and in education time 
(Equations 2 and 3). In the third period, ‘leisure’ time consists of two parts: non-employment time 
before the effective retirement age ( (1 −       , and time in early retirement after it (1-R). Equation 
(4) then describes composite enjoyed ‘leisure’ of an older worker as a CES-function of both parts. We 
assume imperfect substitutability between the two leisure types. The idea here is that ‘leisure’ time 
after and between periods of work is not the same as ‘leisure’ time in periods when individuals are   8 
not economically active anymore
3. Equation (4) expresses that individuals prefer to have a balanced 
combination of both rather than an ‘extreme’ amount of one of them (and very little of the other). In 
this equation ρ is the constant elasticity of substitution, π is a usual share parameter and Ω is added 
as a normalization constant such that the magnitude of ℓ3 corresponds to the magnitude of total 
leisure time 1-n3.
 4  The latter assumption allows to interpret g3 as the relative value of ‘leisure’ versus 
consumption in the third period, comparable to g1 and g2.  
 
Figure 1. Life-cycle of an individual of generation t 
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Individuals will choose consumption, labor supply, education and their effective retirement age to 
maximize Equation (1), subject to Equations (2)-(4) and the constraints described in (5)-(12).  
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3 The former may be particularly valuable from the perspective of relaxation and time to spend on personal 
activities of short duration. The latter may be valuable to enjoy activities which take more time and ask for 
longer term commitment (e.g. long journeys, non-market activity as a volunteer).  
4 The results in this paper are not in any way influenced by the magnitude of π, Ω or ρ (see Section 4.1.). 
20      35      50         65                      80   
R 
 | 
   9 




























                             (12)  
             
The LHS of Equations (5)-(8) shows that individuals allocate their disposable income to consumption 
(including consumption taxes, tc) and the accumulation of non-human wealth a. We denote by 
t
j a  
the stock of wealth that an individual who enters the model at time t holds at the end of his jth 
period of life. During the three periods of active life disposable income at the RHS includes after-tax 
labor income, non-employment benefits, interest income and lump sum transfers. In each equation, 
wk stands for the real wage per unit of effective labor at time k, rk is the exogenous (world) real 
interest rate at time k, and zk is the lump sum transfer that the government pays out to all individuals 
at time k. Effective labor of an individual depends on hours worked (  
 ) and effective human capital 
(ℎ 
 ).  Since young individuals allocate a fraction   
  of their time to work, and pay a tax rate on labor 
income  t1,  they  earn  an  after-tax  real  wage  equal  to 
1 1 1 1
t t
t w h n ( ) t - .  After-tax  labor  income  of 
middle-aged and older workers in equations (6) and (7) is determined similarly. A young worker 
inherits his effective human capital from the middle-aged generation, as shown in Equation (9). 
During the second and third period, workers supply more units of effective human capital. It is our 
assumption in Equation (10) that h rises in education time when young (e), productive government 
spending in percent of GDP (gy, mainly education) and the quality of education (q). We specify and 
discuss the effective human capital production function in Section 3.2. Individuals take gy and q as 
exogenous. We assume that human capital remains unchanged between the second and third period. 
We have in mind that learning by doing in work may counteract depreciation.  
For the fraction of time that young, middle-aged and older individuals are inactive, they receive a 
non-employment  benefit  from  the  government.  Older  workers  may  be  eligible  to  two  kinds  of 
benefits: standard non-employment benefits (analogous to what young and middle-aged workers 
receive)  as  long  as  they  are  on  the  labor  market,  and  early  retirement  benefits  after  having 
withdrawn from the labor market. All benefits are defined as a proportion of the after-tax wage of a 
full-time worker. The replacement rate for standard non-employment benefits is bj with j=1,2,3a, for 
early retirement benefits it is b3b.
5 After the statutory retirement age (65) individuals have no labor 
income and no non-employment benefits anymore. They then receive an old-age pension benefit (pp) 
and the lump sum transfer. Equation (11) describes the old-age pension. We assume a public PAYG 
pension system in which pensions in period k are financed by contributions (labor taxes) from the 
active  generations  in  that  period  k  (see  below).  Individual  net  pension  benefits  consist  of  two 
                                                           
5 Our approach to model early retirement benefits as a function of a worker’s last labor income, similar to 
standard non-employment benefits, reflects regulation and/or common practice in many countries. In some 
countries  (e.g.  Belgium,  the  Netherlands)  workers  can  enter  the  early  retirement  regime  only  from 
employment, with their benefits being linked to the last wage. In other countries (e.g. Denmark) there is only 
access  from  unemployment,  with  the  early  retirement  benefit  being  linked  to  the  unemployment  benefit 
(Salomäki,  2003).  As  to  common  practice,  Duval  (2003)  confirms  that  in  many  countries,  unemployment-
related or disability benefits can be used de facto to bridge the time between the effective retirement age and 
old-age pension eligibility. Again there is a link between benefits and former wages.    10
components. A first one is related to the individual’s earlier net labor income. It is a fraction of his so-
called pension base, i.e. a weighted average of revalued net labor income in each of the three active 
periods of life. The net replacement rate is b4a. The parameters p1, p2 and p3 represent the weights 
attached to each period. This part of the pension rises in the individual’s hours of work    
  and his 
human capital ℎ 
 . It will be lower when the individual retires early (lower R
t). Thanks to revaluation, 
this part of the net pension is adjusted to increases in the overall standard of living between the time 
that workers build their pension entitlements and the time that they receive the pension. We assume 
that past earnings are revalued in line with economy-wide wage growth x and hence follow practice 
in many OECD countries (OECD, 2005; Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006).
6 The second component of 
the pension is a flat-rate or basic pension. Every retiree receives the same amount related to average 
net labor income in the economy at the time of retirement. This assumption assures that also basic 
pensions rise in line with productivity. Here, the  net replacement rate is b4b. Fourth generation 
individuals consume their pension and the lump sum transfer, as well as their accumulated wealth 
from the third period plus interest. They leave no debts, nor bequests. 
Substituting Equations (2)-(4) for   
  and (5)-(8) for   
  into Equation (1), and maximizing with respect 
to  3 1 2 3 1 2
t t t t t t t ,a ,a ,n ,n ,n a ,e ɶ and 
t R , yields eight first order conditions for the optimal behavior of an 
agent  entering  the  model  at  time  t.  Equation  (13)  expresses  the  law  of  motion  of  optimal 
consumption over time. Equations (14.a), (14.b) and (14.c) describe the optimal labor-leisure choice 
in each period of active live. In each period, individuals supply labor up to the point where the 
marginal utility of leisure equals the marginal utility gain from work. The latter  consists of two parts. 
Working more hours in a particular period raises additional resources for consumption both in that 
period and when retired. The marginal utility gain from work is higher when initial consumption is 
lower, and when an extra hour of work yields more extra consumption. Higher human capital (and its 
underlying  determinants),  lower  taxes  on  labor,  lower  taxes  on  consumption  and  lower  non-
employment benefits contribute to the gain from work. Extra consumption during retirement rises in 
the  own-income-related  pension  replacement  rate  (b4a),  in  the  weight  attached  to  the  relevant 
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6 We explain economy wide wage growth in Section 3.3. Individuals take it as exogenous.   11
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(14.c) 
 
Equations (14.a)-(14.c) highlight positive substitution effects from the pension replacement rate b4a. 
To the extent that higher replacement rates raise individuals’ consumption possibilities (cj), they also 
cause adverse income effects on labor supply. Basic pensions (b4b) do not directly occur in Equations 
(14), but they do affect employment via this income effect. 
Equation (15) describes the first order condition for the optimal effective retirement age. The 
LHS represents the utility loss from postponing retirement. Later retirement reduces enjoyed leisure 
as early retiree, but raises enjoyed leisure in between periods of work for given work time    3. The 
RHS shows the marginal utility gain from postponing retirement. This marginal gain follows from 
consuming the extra labor income (vis-à-vis the early retirement benefit) in the third period, and the 
higher future old-age pension after 65. The latter effect rises in b4a and p3. 
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(15) 
Finally, equation (16) imposes that the marginal utility loss from investing in human capital when 
young equals the total discounted marginal utility gain in later periods from having more human 
capital. Individuals will study more the higher future versus current after-tax real wages and the 
higher  the  marginal  return  of  education  to  human  capital ( / e) y ¶ ¶ .  Labor  taxes  during  youth 
therefore  encourage  individuals  to  study,  whereas  labor  taxes  in  later  periods  of  active  life 
discourage them. Notice also that high benefit replacement rates in later periods (b2, b3a, b3b) and a 
high  income-related  pension  replacement  rate  (b4a),  combined with  high  weights  p2  and  p3,  will 
encourage young individuals to study. The reason is that any future benefits and the future pension 
rise in future labor income, and therefore human capital. A final interesting result is that young 
people study more – all other things equal – if they expect to work harder in later periods (n2, 
n3=R.   3). 
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It  will  be  obvious  from  the  above  discussion  that  (for  a  given  way  of  financing)  the  specific 
organization of pension benefits may have strong effects on behavior in earlier periods of life. Both 
income and substitution effects occur. The latter are particularly rich when pensions are linked to 
individuals’ own labor income. A higher replacement rate b4a raises the return to working (n) and 
building human capital (e, h) in earlier periods. Changes in the particular weight attached to these 
earlier periods may modify these incentive effects. The return to education will rise in p2 and p3, but 
fall in p1. The return to working in the third period will rise in p3, etc. Policy makers may change all 
these parameters. We investigate the effects of policy interventions in Section 5.  
 
3.2. Production of effective human capital 
The specification and parameterization of the human capital production function is often a problem 
in numerical endogenous growth models. In contrast to goods production functions, there is not 
much empirical evidence and no consensus about the determinants of human capital growth, nor 
about the underlying functional form and parameter values (Bouzahzah et al, 2002, Arcalean and 
Schiopu, 2010). The literature shows a variety of functions, typically including one or two of the 
following  inputs:  individual  time  allocated  to  education,  private  expenditures  on  education  by 
individuals themselves or by their parents, and government expenditures on education (e.g. Lucas, 
1988,  Glomm  and  Ravikumar,  1992;  Docquier  and  Michel,  1999,  Kaganovich  and  Zilcha,  1999; 
Bouzahzah et al., 2002; Fougère et al., 2009; Arcalean and Schiopu, 2010). In case of two inputs, the 
adopted functional form is very often Cobb-Douglas (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Kaganovich 
and Zilcha, 1999; Docquier and Michel, 1999).  
Our specification also includes education time of young individuals and education expenditures by 
the government. We see these variables as indicators for the quantity of invested private and public 
resources. However, our specification is broader than this. First, we take recent empirical evidence 
seriously that the quality of education and the schooling system is very important (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2009). Better quality implies higher cognitive skills for the same allocation of resources. 
As a proxy for quality we will use OECD PISA science scores (see Section 4.2 for further discussion). As 
a second extension, our definition of relevant (productive) government  expenditures includes more 
than  education.  It  also  includes  active  labor  market  expenditures,  public  R&D  expenditures  and 
public fixed investment. This approach goes back to our use of the broader concept of effective 
human capital. As in Dhont and Heylen (2009), effective human capital (and worker productivity) rise 
not only in accumulated schooling or training, but also in the productive efficiency of accumulated 
schooling. Education and active labor market expenditures directly contribute to more human capital 
being accumulated, public R&D and fixed investment expenditures will mainly raise the productive   13
efficiency of accumulated human capital. The hypothesis that public investment and infrastructure 
services may also matter for aggregate human capital, next to education expenditures, has been 
developed recently by Agénor (2008). 
Equation (17) shows our specification for the growth rate of effective human capital. We adopt a 
flexible CES-specification in education time when young (e) and productive government expenditures 
in % of output (gy). We add the quality of education (q) in a multiplicative way. We allow q to vary 
across countries in later sections. Next to q we introduce (constant, common) technical parameters: 
f  is a positive efficiency parameter, s a scale parameter, v is a share parameter and k  the elasticity 
of substitution. These parameters will be calibrated.  
( )
/( 1) 1 (1/ ) 1 (1/ ) ( , , ) (1 ) y y e g q q g e
sk k k k f n n
- - - Y = + -            (17) 
Lack of existing empirical evidence makes an ex-ante assessment of our specification very difficult. In 
previous work, however, we have been able to verify that this specification performs better than 
alternative specifications without quality, with a narrower definition of government expenditures or 
with a different functional form (Heylen and Van de Kerckhove, 2010). In Section 4 we show that our 
model’s predictions for education and per capita growth, which rely on (17), are fairly close to reality 
for most countries. 
 
3.3. Domestic firms, output and factor prices 
Firms act competitively on output and input markets and maximize profits. All firms are identical. 
Total domestic output is given by the production function (18). Technology exhibits constant returns 
to  scale  in  aggregate  physical  capital  (Kt)  and  effective  labor  (Ht),  so  that  profits  are  zero  in 
equilibrium. Equation (19) describes total effective labor supplied by young, middle-aged and older 
workers. Note our assumptions that each generation has size 1 and that young workers inherit the 
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and where we use Equations (9) and (10).  
 
Competitive behavior implies in Equation (20) that firms carry physical capital to the point where its 
after-tax marginal product net of depreciation equals the world real interest rate (see also Backus et 
al., 2008). Physical capital depreciates at rate δk. Capital taxes are source-based: the tax rate tk 
applies to the country in which the capital is used, regardless of who owns it. The real interest rate 
being given, firms will install more capital when the amount of effective labor increases or the capital 
tax rate falls. In that case the net return to investment in the home country rises above the world 
interest rate, and capital flows in. Furthermore, perfect competition implies equality between the 
real wage and the marginal product of effective labor (Equation 21). Higher real wages follow from 
an increase in physical capital per unit of effective labor. Taking into account (20), real wages per unit 
of effective labor will therefore fall in the world real interest rate and in domestic capital tax rates. 
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If we finally recognize that in steady state r, tk, x, e, and nj are constant, we obtain the long-run (per 
capita) growth rate of the economy as 
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In line with earlier models (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Buiter and Kletzer, 1993), 
the long-run (per capita) growth rate is positively related to the quality of schooling (q) and to the 
fraction of time that young people allocate to education (e). It is also positively related to the share 
of productive government expenditures (gy), like in Barro (1990).  
 
3.4. Government 
The government runs a balanced budget. Productive expenditures, consumption, benefits related to 
non-employment  (including  early  retirement  benefits),  old-age  pension  benefits,  and  lump  sum 
transfers at time t are financed by taxes on labor, capital and consumption.  
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Following Turnovsky (2000) and Dhont and Heylen (2009), we assume that the government claims 
given fractions gy and gc of output for productive expenditures and consumption. Non-employment 
benefits (Bt) are an unconditional source of income support related to inactivity (‘leisure’) and non-
market household activities. Although it may seem strange to have such transfers in a model without 
involuntary unemployment, one can of course analyse their employment and growth effects as a 
theoretical benchmark case (see also Rogerson, 2007; Dhont and Heylen, 2008, 2009). Moreover, 
there is also clear practical relevance. Unconditional or quasi unconditional benefits to structurally 
non-employed people are a fact of life in many European countries. We further assume that the 
pension  system  is  fully  integrated  into  the  government  accounts.  We  do  not  impose  a  specific 
financing of the PAYG pension plan, the government can use resources from the general budget to 
finance pensions. Finally, as we have mentioned before, the government pays the same lump sum 
transfer zt  to all individuals living at time t.  
 
3.5. Aggregate equilibrium and the current account 
Optimal  behavior  by  firms  and  households,  and  government  spending  for  productive  and 
consumption purposes, underlie aggregate domestic demand for consumption and investment goods 
in the economy. Our assumption that the economy is open implies that aggregate domestic demand 
may differ from supply and income, which generates international capital flows and imbalance on 
the  current  account.  Equation  (24)  describes  aggregate  equilibrium  as  it  can  be  derived  from 
Equations (5)-(8), defined for all generations living at time t, Equations (18)-(21) and Equation (23). In 
Equation (24), Ft  stands for net foreign assets at the beginning of t. The aggregate stock of wealth At 
accumulates wealth held by individuals who entered the model in t-1, t-2 and t-3. 
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4. Parameterization and empirical relevance of the model  
The economic environment described above allows us to simulate the transitory and steady state 
growth and employment effects of various changes in fiscal policy and the pension system. This 
simulation exercise requires us first to parameterize and solve the model. In Section 4.1 we discuss 
our choice of preference and technology parameters. Starting from actual cross-country policy data 
in Section 4.2, we compare in Section 4.3 our model’s predictions with the employment and growth 
differences that we have reported in Table 1. This comparison provides a first and simple test of our 
model’s  empirical  relevance.  In  Section  5  we  consider  both  long-run  equilibrium  effects  and 
transitional dynamics of policy changes. To solve the model and to perform our simulations, we 
choose an algorithm that preserves the non-linear nature of our model. We follow the methodology 
basically proposed by Boucekkine (1995) and implemented by Juillard (1996) in the program Dynare.  
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4.1. Preference and technology parameters 
Table 2 contains an overview of all parameters. Following among others Barro (1990), we set the rate 
of time preference equal to 2% per year. Considering that periods in our model consist of 15 years, 
this choice implies a discount factor b equal to 0.74. With respect to effective labor, we assume a 
share coefficient 1-a
  equal to 0.7. This value is well in line with the literature. For example, King and 
Rebelo (1990) also model goods production as a function of effective labor (human capital) and 
physical capital. They assume a value for 1-a equal to 2/3. There is more controversy in the literature 
about the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure (1/q). Micro studies often 
reveal very low elasticities. However, given our macro focus, these studies may not be the most 
relevant  ones.  Rogerson  and  Wallenius  (2009)  show  that  micro  and  macro  elasticities  may  be 
unrelated. Rogerson (2007) also adopts a macro framework. He puts forward a reasonable range for 
q  from 1 to 3 (Rogerson, 2007, p. 12). In line with this, we impose q to be equal to 2. The world real 
interest rate is assumed constant in steady state and equal to 4.25% per year. Considering a period of 
15 years, this implies that r = 0.867. Finally, we set the physical capital depreciation rate to 7.5% per 
year, which implies δk=0.689. Our values for these parameters are within the range of existing studies.  
 
 
Table 2 Preference and technology parameters  
 
 
Production parameters (output)  1 0.7 a - =  
Effective human capital production  4 48 0 99 0 125 0 375 . ,  . , v . ,  . f s k = = = =  
Preference parameters  1 2 3 ,  ,  0.74 2 0.063,  0.125,  0.189 b q g g g = = = = =  
  ,  0.5 1.4,  2 p r = = W=  
World real interest rate  0 867 r . =  
Physical capital depreciation rate  0 689 k . d =  
 
A  second  series  of  parameters  have  been  determined  by  calibration:  three  taste  for  leisure 
parameters  (g1, g2,  g3), two  parameters  in the  human  capital  production  function  (the  efficiency 
parameter f and the scale parameter s), and the elasticity of substitution (r) in the composite leisure 
function in Equation (4). We have calibrated these parameters to Belgium. We choose this country 
since in Belgium the calculation of pension benefits fits exactly within the way we model it. Public 
pensions are proportional to average annual labor income earned over a period of 45 years, with 
equal weights to all years. There is no basic pension (OECD, 2005). In our model this comes down to 
b4a>0, b4b=0 and p1=p2=p3=1/3. The parameters g1, g2, g3, f, s and r have been determined such that 
with  observed  levels  of  the  policy  variables  (tax  rates,  benefit  replacement  rates,  pension 
replacement  rate,  etc.)  and  the  observed  level  of  schooling  quality  (q)
7 in  Belgium,  the  model 
correctly predicts Belgium’s employment rates (n1, n2, n3), per capita growth rate, education rate (e) 
and effective retirement age (R) in 1995-2007. Underlying performance and policy data are reported 
in Tables 1, 3 and 4. We find that the taste for leisure rises with age (g1=0.063, g2=0.125, g3=0.189). 
Furthermore, we observe quasi constant returns in human capital production (s
 ≈
 1), and a stronger 
                                                           
7 And with the values of two parameters in the human capital production function (v, k) that we discuss below 
(see also footnote 8).   17
degree of substitutability than in the Cobb-Douglas case between the two types of leisure for older 
workers (ρ = 1.4). 
We had no ex ante indication on two parameters in the human capital production function: the share 
parameter v and the elasticity of substitution parameter k. We could assign sensible values to these 
parameters thanks to a sensitivity analysis on the results that we report in the next section. There we 
evaluate the capacity of our model to explain six important macro variables in 13 OECD countries. 
Although the influence of v and k  on the explanatory power of our model is very limited, our 
guideline to pin down specific values for these parameters (within a sensible range) was to minimize 
the deviation of our model’s predictions from the true data
8. This procedure implied v=0.125 and k= 
0.375. The result for k reveals a higher degree of complementarity between private education time 
and  government  expenditures  than  in  the  Cobb-Douglas  case.  The  result  for  v  demonstrates 
relatively high importance for human capital formation of private education time versus productive 
public expenditures. Neither did we have an ex ante indication on the remaining parameters in the 
composite leisure function in Equation (4). We impose equal weight for both leisure types (π=0.5). 
The normalisation parameter Ω equals 2. The size of this parameter has no impact at all on our 
country predictions or simulation results. 
 
4.2. Fiscal policy, pensions and education quality 
Tables 3 and 4 describe key characteristics of fiscal policy and the pension system in 1995-2001/2004. 
Reported data are averages of the available annual data in that period, unless indicated otherwise. 
Our description of the data here is short. For some variables we provide more detail in Appendix 1. 
Our proxy for the tax rate on labor income concerns the total tax wedge, for which we report the 
marginal rate in %. The data cover personal income taxes, employee and employer social security 
contributions payable on wage earnings and payroll taxes. The OECD publishes these tax data for 
several family and income situations. Considering that workers typically earn less when they are 
young (and have lower human capital) than when they are middle-aged, we calculated our t1 for 
each country as an average of marginal tax rates for lower to middle income families. Tax rates for 
middle-aged and older workers were computed from OECD data for middle to higher income families. 
As one can see in Table 3, however, differences within countries between t1 on the one hand and t2  
and t3 on the other, are very small. Cross-country differences are much bigger. Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden and Finland have marginal labor tax rates above 55% or even 60%. The US and the UK have 
marginal labor tax rates below, or close to, 40%. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax 
rates reported by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (their EMTR, base case). Germany and Belgium have 
the highest rates. In contrast to labor (and consumption), capital is taxed relatively little in the Nordic 
countries. As to consumption taxes, we follow Dhont and Heylen (2009) in computing them as the 
ratio of government indirect tax receipts (net of subsidies paid) to total domestic demand net of 
indirect taxes and subsidies. Our simplifying assumption is that consumption tax rates correspond to 
                                                           
8 From our model’s predictions and the true data for 13 countries we computed for each variable (n1, n2, n3, e, R, 
growth) the root mean squared error normalized to the mean. We minimized the average normalized RMSE 
over all six variables. We then adopted the following iterative procedure. Given chosen values for v and k we 
calibrated the efficiency parameter f and the scale parameter s. The values for v and k had no influence on the 
calibration results for gj. Given the values for f and s , we checked whether changes in v and k could further 
improve the model’s explanatory power. New values for v and k led to a recalibration of s  and f, etc.   18
aggregate indirect tax rates. The Nordic countries stand out with the highest consumption tax rates, 
the US with the lowest. 
 
Table 3 Fiscal policy (Tax rates) 
 




tax rate on labor 
income when 
middle age and 




tax rate on 
capital income 
(%) 









Austria  56.5  53.0  13.2  17.3 
Belgium   66.6  67.6  13.4  27.1 
France  52.4  53.3  17.1  21.7 
Germany  62.5  60.0  11.1  34.4 
Italy  54.7  57.1  14.7  14.9 
Netherlands  52.3  51.6  12.2  24.3 
Denmark  46.4  51.2  18.9  22.5 
Finland  55.6  57.9  15.2  17.2 
Norway  49.6  52.6  16.4  22.1 
Sweden  54.5  58.1  17.9  16.1 
UK  39.8  41.6  14.5  21.2 
US  34.2  36.9  7.2  23.6 
Canada  46.8  47.6  14.5  24.8 
         
Overall country 
average 
51.7  52.9  14.3  22.1 
Note:  Labor tax rates are data for the total tax wedge, marginal rate (OECD, Taxing Wages). Data for 2000-04. For details on 
the calculation of tax rates by age group, see Appendix 1. Capital tax rates are effective marginal corporate tax rates 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, their EMTR; data for 1995-2001, see also Devereux et al., 2002).  Consumption tax rate: 
see Dhont and Heylen (2009). Data for 1995-2001. 
 
Table 4 summarizes our data for the expenditure side of fiscal policy. A first variable is our proxy for 
the net non-employment benefit replacement rate bj (j = 1,2,3a). Since in our model non-employment 
is a structural or equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use concern net transfers received by 
structurally or long-term unemployed people. They include social assistance, family benefits and 
housing benefits in the 60
th month of benefit receipt. They also include unemployment insurance or 
unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally 
unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit eligibility
9. The data are expressed in 
percent of after-tax wages. In line with our approach to determine labor tax rates by age group, we 
are again guided by the same family and income cases to determine b1, b2 and b3a (see Appendix 1). 
Overall, the euro area and the Nordic countries pay the highest net benefits on average. Transfers to 
structurally non-employed people are by far the lowest in the US. A related variable is our proxy for 
the net early retirement benefit replacement rate b3b.The data are again expressed in percent of 
after-tax  final  wages. To assess  the  generosity  of early  retirement  we  integrate  the  information 
available via b3a and data for the implicit tax rate on continued work in the early retirement route as 
provided by Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. (2005).  For details, see Appendix 1. We observe a very 
                                                           
9 This is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, and the UK. Workers cannot be structurally 
non-employed and still receive unemployment benefits in the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Norway and the US 
(OECD, 2004, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives, Benefits and Wages, country specific files).    19
generous early retirement regime in Belgium and Finland, whereas net early retirement benefits in 
Anglo-Saxon countries are much lower. 
  Our data for productive government expenditures in Table 4 include education, active labor 
market expenditures, government financed R&D and public investment. Governments in the Nordic 
countries  allocate  by  far  the  highest  fractions  of  output  to  productive  expenditures.  Productive 
expenditures in percent of GDP are the lowest in the UK. The US and most core countries of the euro 
area take intermediate positions. Government consumption in percent of GDP is the highest also in 
the Nordic countries, followed at close distance by several countries of the core euro area
10. In the 
US, government consumption is (much) lower.  
Our data for the net pension replacement rates (b4a, b4b) concern an individual with mean 
earnings before retirement. The data include only (quasi-)mandatory pension programs, and are 
expressed as a percentage of this individual’s average lifetime labor income (OECD, 2005)
11. In the 
majority of countries individuals with mean earnings only receive earnings-related pensions (b4a>0, 
b4b=0). The overall average net replacement rate in these countries is around 70%, but there are 
strong cross-country differences. We observe the highest b4a in Austria and Italy, and low rates in the 
US and Belgium. Differences exist also in the precise organization of the earnings-related system. 
Some countries have pure defined-benefit systems (e.g. Belgium, Finland, US), others have so-called 
point systems (Germany) or notional-account systems (Italy, Sweden).
  Although these three systems 
can appear very different, OECD (2005) shows that they are all similar variants of earnings-related 
pension  schemes.  A  smaller  group  of  countries  combine earnings-related  and  (variants of)  basic 
pension systems. Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have the strongest non-earnings related 
components
12. As a final important remark, we emphasize that the straightforward way in which the 
OECD computes the pension replacement rates, in percent of an individual’s average lifetime labor 
income, comes down to assuming in our model that the weights p1, p2 and p3 are all equal to 1/3. For 
reasons of consistency we will therefore make this assumption for all individual countries when we 
derive  our  model’s  predictions.  We  are  aware  however  that  equal  weights  do  not  fully  match 
practice in all countries. Some deviate from this prototype, to varying degrees.
 13  When we compare 
our model’s predictions for these countries to the facts in the next section, we should take this into 
account. Assuming equal weights may slightly bias our predictions. 
                                                           
10 Note that we calculate government consumption as total government consumption in % of GDP, diminished 
with the fraction of public education outlays going to wages and working-expenses. The latter are included in 
productive expenditures.  
11 In most countries mandatory programs are public. For Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden the data also 
include benefits from mandatory private systems. These benefits are earnings-related. Voluntary, occupational 
pensions are not included in our data. 
12 For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that our proxy for b4b also includes targeted and 
minimum pensions if they are relevant for a worker with mean income. Basic pensions pay the same amount to 
every retiree. Targeted plans pay a higher benefit to poorer pensioners and reduced benefits to better-off ones. 
Minimum pensions are similar to targeted plans. Their main aim is to prevent pensions from falling below a 
certain level (OECD, 2005, p. 22-23). Our main motivation to merge these three categories in our proxy for b4b 
is that they are not (or even inversely) linked to earnings. 
13 In Austria, Norway and France earnings-related pensions are not calculated from average lifetime income but 
from average income during the final working years or a number of years with the highest earnings. Ideally, 
one would impose different weights p1, p2 and p3, although exact data are often not available. Moreover, the 
OECD pension replacement rate would then no longer be reliable since it is based on the assumption of equal 
weights.   20
As a final variable in Table 4 we include PISA science scores. We use these data as a proxy for 
the quality of schooling (q) in the human capital production function (17). We concentrate on science 
scores given their expected closer link to growth. Although available PISA scores relate to secondary 
education, we do not see this as a weakness. PISA scores may be very informative about the quality 
with  which  young  people  enter  tertiary  education.  Quality  at  entrance  should  have  a  positive 
influence  on  people’s  capacity  to  learn  and  to  raise  human  capital  during  tertiary  education. 
Furthermore,  PISA  scores  have  been  found  empirically  significant  for  growth  (Hanushek  and 
Woessmann, 2009). Finally, these scores are easily available for all countries, which is not obvious for 
‘better’ quality indicators. Finland scores best, followed by the Netherlands, Canada and the UK. 
Note that there is no correlation in Table 4 between productive government expenditures and the 
PISA score. Correlation is -0.04. There is no correlation either if we restrict productive expenditures 
to education only. Both variables seem to tell different stories (see also Woessmann, 2003).    
 
 
Table 4  Fiscal policy (net transfer replacement rates, government consumption, productive  



































































                 
Austria  60.8  50.9  69.9  88.9  0  14.6  9.1  5.07 
Belgium  65.1  51.7  75.1  63.1  0  16.9  8.9  5.05 
France  52.3  38.3  59.9  68.8  0  18.3  11.0  5.02 
Germany  65.4  59.7  68.3  71.8  0  15.3  8.6  5.02 
Italy  18.5  15.3  54.9  88.8  0  14.3  8.0  4.80 
Netherlands  62.5  46.6  63.9  48.8  35.3  18.4  10.3  5.25 
Denmark  67.8  55.4  40.0  19.5  34.6  18.4  12.5  4.84 
Finland  68.4  54.4  70.4  78.8  0  16.0  11.4  5.50 
Norway  64.8  49.4  36.2  46.2  18.9  14.7  12.1  4.90 
Sweden  62.8  47.8  35.2  65.9  2.3  20.0  14.0  5.07 
UK  57.8  44.4  36.0  13.8  33.8  14.4  7.3  5.23 
US  34.3  26.6  16.3  51.0  0  10.3  9.3  4.93 
Canada  49.7  39.5  24.6  39.4  17.7  14.7  9.3  5.27 
                 
Overall 
average 
56.2  44.6  49.9  57.3  11.0  15.9  10.1  5.07 
       
  Notes: A description of all variables is given in the main text. For more details, see Appendix 1. The data for net 
non-employment benefit replacement rates are an average for 2001 and 2004 (earlier data are not available). The 
data for government consumption and productive expenditures concern 1995-2001. The PISA science scores are 
an average for 2000, 2003 and 2006. The pension replacement rates concern 2002 (source OECD, 2005, p. 52). To 
split up the OECD data into our b4a and b4b in countries where b4b >0, we have used the information in OECD 
(2005, part II, Country studies). We derive b4b from the fraction of the total net replacement rate that goes to 
basic, minimum or targeted pensions (see also our footnote 12).  
(a) The weights pi to compute the pension base (with j=1, 2, 3) are in all countries assumed equal to 1/3 (see 
motivation in the main text). 
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4.3. Predicted versus actual employment by age, education of young and growth in the OECD  
Can our model match the facts that we have reported in Table 1. In this section we confront our 
model’s predictions with the true data for 1995-2006/2007. Clearly, one should be aware of the 
serious limitations of such an exercise. First of all, our model is highly stylized and may (obviously) 
miss potential determinants of growth or employment. Second, even if we compute the true data in 
Table 1 as averages over a longer period, these averages need not be equal to the steady state. 
Countries may still be moving towards their steady state. Third, this exercise only concerns the last 
15 years. Lack of data – especially with respect to marginal labor tax rates and non-employment 
transfers in the early 1990s – makes it impossible for us to execute the maybe most convincing test, 
which is to relate changes in growth and employment to changes in policy within countries over 
longer time periods. In spite of all this, if one considers the extreme variation in the predictions of 
existing calibrated models investigating the effects of fiscal policy in the literature (see Stokey and 
Rebelo, 1995), even a minimal test of the ‘goodness of fit’ of our model is informative.  
Our calibration implies that our model’s prediction matches employment rates by age, the 
effective retirement age of older workers, education, and per capita growth in Belgium. A test of the 
model’s validity is whether it can also match the data for the other countries, and the cross-country 
differences. Before one uses a model for policy analysis, one would like to see for example that the 
model does not overestimate, nor underestimate the performance differences related to observed 
cross-country  policy  differences.  Our  test  is  tough  since  we  impose  the  same  preference  and 
technology parameters, reported in the upper part of Table 2, on all countries. Only fiscal policy 
variables, the pension replacement rate and education quality differ. Moreover, assuming perfect 
competition, we disregard differences in labor and product market institutions which some authors 
consider of crucial importance (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2005). Still, we find 
that the model matches the facts remarkably well for a large majority of countries. Basically, we here 
confirm earlier findings by e.g. Ohanian et al. (2008) and Dhont and Heylen (2008) that once one 
controls for fiscal policy differences, variation in taste for leisure or different market rigidities are not 
critical to explain cross-country variation in labor market performance.  
Figures 2 to 4 relate our model’s predictions for three employment rates to actual observations for 
all countries. We add the 45°-line to assess the absolute differences between predictions and facts, 
as well as the coefficient of correlation between predictions and facts. Our model performs quite 
well. In each age group, it correctly predicts high employment rates in the US and Canada and low 
employment in Germany. For young workers it also correctly predicts relatively low employment in 
most other countries of the core euro area, and in the Nordic countries. For older workers it has 
relatively high employment right in the Nordic countries and the UK. Overall correlation between the 
model’s predictions and the actual data in Figure 2 is 0.31. If we drop Italy, for which there are good 
reasons
14, this rises to 0.71. Correlation in Figure 3 is 0.43, in Figure 4 it is 0.77. Moreover, in each 
                                                           
14 A major element behind the deviation for this country seems to be underestimation of the fallback income 
position for structurally non-employed young workers. OECD data show very low replacement rates in Italy. 
However, as shown by Reyneri (1994), the gap between Italy and other European countries is much smaller 
than it seems. Reyneri (1994) points to the importance of family support as an alternative to unemployment 
benefits. Fernández Cordón (2001) shows that in Italy young people live much longer with their parents than in 
other countries. In 1995 for example about 56% of people aged 25-29 were still living with their parents in Italy. 
In about all other countries this fraction was below 23%. Of all non-working males aged 25-29 in Italy more 
than 80% were living with their parents. In France or Germany the corresponding numbers were close to 40%.     22
figure - again after dropping Italy from Figure 2 - the regression line (not shown) is close to the 45°-
line, which suggests that our model correctly assesses the size of the employment effects of policy 
differences  across  countries.  Next  to  Italy,  there  are  a  few  other  countries,  where  our  model 
somewhat over- or underpredicts. The model’s employment predictions tend to be too high for 
France,  Italy  and  (except  in  Figure  2)  the  Netherlands.  They  tend  to  be  too  low  in  general  for 
Denmark and Finland.   
 
Figure 2. Employment rate in hours of young individuals (n1), in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.33.  
            Excluding Italy, correlation rises to 0.71. 
 
 
Figure 3. Employment rate in hours of middle-aged individuals (n2), in %, 1995-2007 
 
 

























































Figure 4.  Employment rate in hours of older individuals (n3), in %, 1995-2007 
 
 Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.77.  
 
 
Figure 5 relates our model’s predictions to the facts for the effective retirement age. The model 
again captures the large differences between countries. It predicts the highest retirement age in the 
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries and a much lower retirement age in core euro area countries. 
Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.90.  
  In Figures 6 and 7 we relate our model’s predictions to the facts for education and growth. 
For education, the model correctly captures key differences between the Nordic countries on the 
one hand and countries like the UK, Italy and Belgium on the other. Predictions for education are 
quite close to the 45°-line for all individual countries except Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands.  
The model also has important cross-country differences right for growth. The model has difficulty 
however  to  explain  observed  growth  for  France  and  the  UK.  Correlation  between  the  model’s 
predictions and the true data is 0.63 for education and 0.70 for growth. Finally, in Figure 8, we relate 
our model’s predictions to the facts for the annual current account balance (in % of GDP). Note that 
we have not done any calibration on these data. Our model predicts current account balances of 
about the right size (between -2 and +5% of GDP). It matches cross-country differences fairly well.  
 
 
Figure 5. Effective retirement age, 1995-2006  
 


























































Figure 6. Tertiary education rate (e), in %, 1995-2006  
 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.63. 
 
Figure 7. Annual per capita potential GDP growth, in %, 1995-2007 
 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.70. 
 
 
Figure 8. Annual current account balance, in % of GDP, 1995-2007 
 
Note: The dotted line is the 45°-line. We have excluded Norway from this figure as Norway is a clear outlier in 
the current account data (10.7% of GDP). Correlation between actual data and the model’s predictions is 0.61. 















































































   25
5. Fiscal policy shocks and public pension reform. 
 
Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we now simulate a series of policy shocks. 
Our aim is to discover the (relative) effectiveness of various reforms of the pension system for the 
employment rate of three age groups, aggregate employment, education of the young, the effective 
retirement  age,  and  growth.  In  Section  5.1  we  consider  steady  state  effects,  in  Section  5.2 
transitional dynamics and welfare effects per generation. The particular pattern of transitory effects 
implies  that  subsequent  generations’  welfare  may  be  affected  differently.  The  benchmark  from 
which we start, and against which all policy shocks are evaluated, is the average of the six core euro 
area countries in our sample.  
 
5.1. Numerical steady state effects. 
 
The main part of Table 5 shows the steady state effects of six changes in key features of the pension 
system. Any effects on the government budget are neutralized by a change in lump sum transfers (z), 
spread equally among all generations. This change in lump sum transfers is indicated at the bottom 
of the table. Policy 1 raises the earnings-related net benefit replacement rate b4a from 72% in the 
benchmark  to  77%.  This  policy  intervention  is  equivalent  to  an  ex  ante  increase  in  pension 
expenditures by 0.5% of GDP. The policy implies a slight increase in employment, especially among 
older workers.  It  has only  minor  positive  effects on  education  and  a  quasi  negligible  impact  on 
growth. All in all, behavioral effects are small
15. Financial effects are somewhat stronger. A rise in the 
replacement rate induces an increase in the pension burden and a (limited) deterioration of the 
government’s financial balance. To maintain budget balance (as in the benchmark) the government 
has to reduce lump sum transfers by 0.39% of output. Policies 2 and 3 alter the calculation of the 
pension base, such that more weight is given to the net labor income of workers when they are 
‘older’. These policies involve an increase in p3, and a fall in p1. We assume that these reforms do not 
hold for the current generation of retirees as they are no longer able to adapt their behavior to these 
new pension weights. The higher (lower) marginal utility from work when older (young) makes it 
interesting to shift work from the first period of active life to the third, and to postpone effective 
retirement. Furthermore, young individuals are encouraged to study because the lifetime return to 
building human capital rises. This follows first from the perspective of working longer and second 
from the greater importance of effective human capital when old in the pension calculation. Extra 
schooling  contributes  to  steady-state  growth.  Interestingly,  the  government  budget  does  not 
deteriorate. For instance, policy 3 implies an improvement in the budget balance by 0.89% of GDP
16. 
All in all, simple reforms like policies 2 and 3 succeed in strongly increasing the employment rate 
among older workers (+4.21%-points and +7.87%-points respectively) and their effective retirement 
age (up to almost +1 year in policy 3). The effect on the aggregate employment rate is limited due to 
the  significant  drop  in  employment  of  the  young.  Fortunately,  more  than  half  of  the  latter  is 
substituted into tertiary education. We observe a substantial increase in the per capita growth rate 
(+0.23%-points in policy 3).  
                                                           
15 Effects are even (about 50%) smaller if labor taxes are adjusted to maintain budget balance. 
16 That is, to maintain budget balance (as in the benchmark) the government can raise lump sum transfers by 
0.89% of output.   26
Policy 4 combines policies 1 and 3. We find that complementing the alternative calculation of the 
pension base proposed in policy 3, by an increase in the replacement rate, provokes the strongest 
rise in employment, education and growth. An increase in the pension burden notwithstanding, net 
effects on the government budget are positive (as lump sum transfers do not decline). An important 
element is that a higher pension replacement rate raises the return to working when middle-aged 
and older, and to building human capital when young. Policy 5 shows the effects of a shift from 
individual earnings-related pensions to ‘basic’ pensions. The ex ante budgetary effect of this shift is 
zero. As can be seen, overall employment, education and growth effects are negative. A key element 
is the fall in the return to working and studying when the pension replacement rate b4a  is reduced. 
Ex post effects on the government budget are also negative. 
 
.Table 5. Effects of pension reform – Effects for a benchmark of 6 core euro area countries (Austria,       

























































(a):                   
Dn1  0.08  -2.88  -6.13  -6.45  -0.17    0.47  -2.83  3.75  0.11 
Dn2   0.23  0.18  0.49  0.77  -0.63  -0.69  -0.02  0.88  -0.59 
Dn3  0.61  4.21  7.87  8.74  -2.00  -6.55  7.57  0.34  6.23 
DR 
(c)  0.08  0.51  0.93  1.02  -0.26  -1.02  0.91  0.15  1.72 
De  0.07  1.53  3.21  3.51  -0.22  -0.56  0.00  -1.50  -0.50 
   
           
   
Dn 
(a, b)  0.29  0.31  0.38  0.63  -0.87  -2.00  1.23  1.70  1.63 
DN/N 





0.01  0.11  0.23  0.25  -0.02  -0.04 
 
0.00  -0.12  -0.04 
DZ  ex  post 
(e)  -0.39  0.64  0.89  0.49  -0.44  -3.53  0.75  1.49  1.98 
Notes:   (a) difference in percentage points between new steady state and benchmark, except ∆N/N and R. 
(b) change in (weighted) aggregate employment rate in hours, change in percentage points. 
(c) change in optimal effective retirement age in years 
(d) change in volume of employment in hours, in %.  
  (e) change in lump sum transfer (as a fraction of output) to maintain budget balance, in %-points. 
 
 
Policy 6 is a gradual shift from the PAYG system in the benchmark to a system with full private capital 
funding. This policy completely abolishes old-age pension benefits (b4a , b4b). For the government it 
implies  a  drastic  cut  in  pension  expenditures.  We  assume  that  this  drop  in  expenditures  feeds 
through into lower social security contributions for all workers such that, ex ante, the decline in total   27
labor tax receipts in % of GDP is exactly the same as the drop in pension expenditures.
17 We observe 
that this transition to a private fully-funded pension scheme is not beneficial for employment. The 
aggregate employment rate drops by 2%-points. An important element here is that a fully-funded 
system breaks the direct positive link between individual labor income and the pension, which exists 
in the PAYG system as we have modeled it. Growth decreases (-0.04%-points) as tertiary education is 
discouraged both by the fall in the pension replacement rate b4a, and by the cut in labor taxes when 
young. The labor tax cut when middle-aged and older cannot neutralize the negative effect. Smaller 
accumulation of human capital also discourages work when older. As a final result, we also observe 
that  a  shift  to  a  fully-funded  system  affects  the  government  balance  negatively  (as  lump  sum 
transfers decline by 3.53% of GDP). The latter is explained by the decline in the tax base as hours of 
work decrease. Another element is that, although we also find that moving to a system with private 
capital funding encourages national savings (see e.g. Feldstein, 1974, 2005), this need not imply an 
increase  in  domestic  physical  capital  formation  (and  capital  taxes).  If  effective  labor  supply  and 
employment fall, this reduces the marginal product of physical capital, and causes savings to be 
invested abroad (see below, current account). 
Our main result in Table 5 is that an intelligent PAYG system may have positive effects on both 
employment, the effective retirement age, and growth. It may perform (much) better than a system 
with a strong basic pension component, or a system with full private funding. A key element is to 
have a tight link between individuals’ own labor income (and therefore hours worked and human 
capital) in later years of the career and the pension. Such a policy stimulates labor supply when 
middle-aged and older, and education when young. Positive effects on human capital formation 
promote future productivity and earnings capacity, also for future generations.  
Our  conclusion  is  in  line  with  some  recent  literature,  but  goes  against  other.  Additional 
results may explain part of the differences. First, our findings support analytical results by Jaag et al. 
(2010) and Fisher and Keuschnigg (2010) among others that a strong link between own contributions 
and the pension strengthens incentives to work (see also Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Cigno, 2010). 
Flat pension regimes imply lower overall employment. This is clear from policy 5, which establishes a 
stronger link between a retiree’s pension and the average net labor income of working generations 
at the time of his retirement (and a weaker link with his own labor income). Second, our findings 
from policies 3 and 4 also support the positive effects on the effective retirement age and the labor 
supply of older workers from letting the pension rise in labor income and contributions paid as an 
older worker, as emphasized by Sheshinski (1978), Gruber and Wise (2002) and Lindbeck and Persson 
(2003). Highly similar effects on n3 and R follow from reducing the net replacement rate in the early 
retirement regime (b3b). Policy 7 brings down b3b by 28%-points, i.e. a reduction from 65% in the 
euro area benchmark to 37%, which is the average for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Note however 
that this policy reduces the return to education and human capital formation, since early retirement 
benefits  rise  in  human  capital.  This  result  illustrates,  as  a  third  observation,  the  importance  of 
endogenous  education  and  growth  in  an  analysis  of  pension  reform.  The  role  of  endogenous 
                                                           
17 In particular, the gradual decline in b4a  and b4b is announced at time t=1 and implemented as  follows. 
Pensions benefits are not reduced for retirees at the moment of policy implementation (t=1), since retirees are 
not able to react to a pension reduction. In t=2 and t=3 the replacement rates are respectively reduced to 2/3 
and 1/3 of their initial rates. From t=4 onwards, b4a and b4b are zero. At each moment, overall labor tax rates 
are reduced to ex ante compensate for the decline in pension expenditures.   28
education also qualifies the importance of labor supply effects for young workers. We also find, like 
Jaag et al. (2010), that a higher weight attached to labor income as an older worker (p3) may reduce 
labor  supply  of  the  young.  In  our  model,  however,  this  may  have  positive  effects  due  to  the 
endogeneity of human capital and growth. The endogeneity of human capital is crucial also in the 
comparison of a PAYG system with a fully-funded private capital system when it comes to growth. 
Our results are in line with findings by Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) and Kaganovich and Meier (2008) 
that a PAYG system can raise growth compared to a fully-funded scheme because it strengthens 
incentives to invest in education. A key element is that a PAYG system allows individuals to partially 
internalize the positive externalities of human capital formation. In Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), as in 
our approach, a PAYG system raises the return to education because of the close link between an 
individual’s pension benefit and his/her own accumulated human capital. Kaganovich and Meier 
(2008)  show  higher  growth  in  a  flat  pension  system.  Here,  individuals  will  invest  more  in  their 
children’s education because their children’s productivity determines their future pension. Policy 4b 
in  Table  5  revisits  policy  4  under  the  assumption  of  exogenous  education  and  growth.  Overall 
employment rises more than in policy 4, mainly thanks to a smaller shift from employment into 
education by young workers. Unlike the relatively limited effects here, we will see below much 
stronger welfare effects, especially for future generations.  
 
Our results also go against some of the literature. Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010) and Ludwig et al. 
(2010) among others tend to find that economies are better able to face ageing with a fully-funded 
system. Furthermore, despite positive effects on employment from an intelligently designed PAYG 
system,  many  studies  find  the  highest  employment  in  a  fully-funded  system  (e.g.  Fisher  and 
Keuschnigg, 2010). We learn from our simulations that the specific setup of the pension system in 
these papers may explain the difference. Some studies compare the fully-funded system with a flat 
PAYG system. Clearly, this approach is crucial for the results. If we reinforce the shift to a flat pension 
in our policy 5 by bringing b4a to zero and by simultaneously raising b4b, employment effects are 
indeed worse than in policy 6 (Dn in this extreme version of policy 5 would be -4 percentage points). 
Other  studies  neglect  the  difference  between  early  retirement  and  old-age  pension  systems. 
Workers in these studies are free to choose the age at which they step from work into old-age 
retirement. A PAYG pension then directly raises the opportunity cost of working. Clearly, this setup is 
not very realistic. In most countries early retirement benefits raise the opportunity cost of work, old-
age pensions don’t. It is hard to quantify in our model the effects of moving from such a system 
(where workers optimally choose the age to go from work directly into old-age pensions) to a fully-
funded system. Since such a PAYG system does not exist in most countries, it cannot establish a 
reliable  benchmark.  When,  however,  we  quantify  the  effects  of  (i)  moving  from  our  current 
benchmark to such a PAYG system, and (ii) moving from our current benchmark to a fully-funded 
system without an early retirement regime, we find that the movement to a fully-funded system 
yields indeed better performance and welfare. This is in line with the literature, but - again - not a 
realistic setup or exercise.  
Policy 6b highlights a third possible reason for why one may find in the literature that moving 
to a fully-funded system is better than an (intelligent) PAYG system. In this policy we treat non-
employment benefits differently than in policy 6. More precisely, if moving to a fully-funded system 
implies a cut in taxes on labor, this may also raise net non-employment benefits, when these are  
proportional to net wages. The gain from work versus non-employment then remains unaffected. 
This is what happens in policy 6. In policy 6b, by contrast, we keep net non-employment benefits   29
unchanged, such that the labor tax cut raises the relative gain from work. This setup is much more in 
line with the literature, where non-employment benefits are often disregarded. As one can see in 
Table 5, moving to a fully-funded system now implies a strong increase in aggregate employment. All 
age groups work more. It should be clear, however, that the main element here is not the shift in the 
pension  regime,  but  the  relative  reduction  in  non-employment  benefits.  In  Heylen  and  Van  de 
Kerckhove  (2010)  we  report  highly  similar  employment  effects  from  an  absolute  cut  in  non-
employment benefits (bj, with j=1,2,3a) for unchanged labor taxes, and a constant pension system. 
Moreover,  the  employment  success  of  policy  6b  also  comes  at  a  cost.  The  strong  rise  in  the 
employment rate of the young runs parallel with a strong reduction in education, and the largest fall 
in steady state growth.   
 
5.2. Transitional dynamics and welfare effects per generation. 
 
We now describe the transitory adjustment path of key variables, including welfare, after the main 
pension reforms discussed in Table 5. Figure 9 shows the evolution of aggregate output, Figure 10 
the evolution of the aggregate employment rate. Policy changes are introduced in period 1. We 
assume that these policy changes are unanticipated and permanent. In the ‘short-run’ we observe 
small output losses after most policies, except policies 7 and 4b. The latter two policies are the only  
ones that succeed in raising aggregate employment in the ‘short-run’. Policies 5, 6 and 6b show the 
worst short-run output evolution, which is again mainly driven by the evolution of employment. In 
the long-run, differences between policies are much more pronounced. Rather than employment, 
the evolution of education and human capital is now crucial. (Remember that human capital also 
attracts physical capital in our model). The strongest ‘long-run’ output effects follow from policy 4 
(+19.7% after 6 periods), followed by policies 3 and 2. These are also the policies that encourage 
education most. Note that under the assumption of constant participation in education (policy 4b), 
output effects in Figure 10 are much more limited. We also observe strong output growth during 
periods 2, 3 and 4 under policies 6 and 6b, but this growth is not persistent
18. 
Figure 11 shows the welfare effects of these policy changes for current and future generations. We 
report on the vertical axis the welfare effect on the generation born in t+k, where k is indicated on 
the horizontal axis, and where t is the period when the (permanent, unanticipated) policy change is 
introduced. Our welfare measure is the (constant) percentage change in benchmark consumption in 
each period of remaining life that individuals should get to attain the same lifetime utility as after the 
policy shock (see also King and Rebelo, 1990). For example, concentrating on policy 3, a shift in the 
weights underlying the pension base in favor of the third period (p3) implies a welfare gain for the 
current young (k=0), equal to 1.28% of benchmark consumption. The gain for the current middle-
aged and retired (k
 =
 -1, -3)  is slightly positive whereas the current old slightly lose welfare (-0.85% of 
benchmark  consumption.  All  future  generations  (k>0)  gain.  For  the  generation  that  is  young  in 
period t+2, for example, policy 3 implies a welfare gain of almost 9% of benchmark consumption. 
                                                           
18 The announcement of the transition to a fully-funded system, and the perspective of a gradual fall in labor 
taxes during periods 2, 3 and 4, as described in footnote 17, makes individuals work less when young (and work 
more in later periods – at lower tax rates). Young individuals therefore study more, which is good for the 
evolution of human capital, and output. As we report in Table 5, however, this positive education effect is not 
permanent (on the contrary).    30
 
Figure 9. Output level evolution after permanent policy shocks introduced in period 1  






Figure 10. Aggregate employment rate in % after permanent policy shocks introduced in period 1   
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Our most interesting findings concern the overall welfare gain for current and (especially) future 
generations  following  the  adoption  of  policy  4.  An  increase  in  the  pension  replacement  rate, 
combined with a higher weight  p3 in the computation of the pension base, does not only have 
significant beneficial effects on employment and growth, but also on welfare. This reform results in 
the largest welfare gains when compared to our other policy measures. A comparison of welfare 
effects from policies 4 and 4b reveals, however, the crucial role of policy 4’s strong positive effects 
on growth. This observation is important: neglecting possible effects of pension reform on human 
capital  and  growth  may  yield  very  different  conclusions  about  welfare.  The  important  role  of 
endogenous human capital has recently been shown also by Ludwig et al. (2010). Finally, we observe 
the considerable overall welfare losses for current generations following the adoption of policy 6. 
The cost imposed on the transition generations is a well-known problem in policy proposals that 
consider to substitute a fully-funded private system for a PAYG model. Welfare effects on future 
generations are much more positive, however. A different treatment of non-employment benefits in 
policy 6b does not affect these conclusions. Finally, we observe consistently negative welfare effects 
on all generations from moving to basic pensions in policy 5. 
 
 




Note:  The vertical axis indicates the welfare effect for the generation born in t+k, where t is when  
             the policy change is introduced. The horizontal axis indicates k.  




Figure 12 shows the evolution of the current account under the different pension policies.  In the first 
periods after the policy reform, it reveals strong capital outflows in policy 6, which is in line with the 
literature,  and  inflows  in  many  other  policies.  In  line  with  our  earlier  findings,  changes  in 
employment and human capital (which affect the productivity of physical capital) and savings can 
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6. Conclusions  
 
Rising pressure on the welfare state due to ageing is forcing all OECD countries to develop effective 
employment and growth policies, and to reconsider pension and social security systems. This paper 
shows that both tasks are highly related. Pension reform can be an important policy instrument for 
higher employment (mainly of older workers), human capital and growth. 
We build and parameterize a four-period OLG model for an open economy to study hours of work 
among young, middle-aged and older workers, education of the young, the effective retirement age 
of older workers, and aggregate per capita growth, within one coherent framework. We explain 
these  endogenous  variables  as  functions  of  various  tax  rates,  various  kinds  of  government 
expenditures, and key characteristics of the public PAYG pension system. Old-age pensions in our 
model are related to earned labor income over the three periods of active life, but the link between 
pension benefits and earlier labor income (and contributions) may be tight or loose. The government 
can also decide on the weight attached to each of the three active periods in the pension assessment 
base.  Finally,  we  pay  particular  attention  to  a  realistic  modeling of  the transition  from work  to 
retirement.  Workers  can  optimally  choose  their  effective  retirement  age,  and  receive  early 
retirement benefits. However, the statutory retirement age after which old-age pensions are being 
paid, is exogenous.  
We find that our model explains the facts remarkably well for many OECD countries. We then use the 
model to investigate the effects of various reforms of the pension system. Studying pension reform 
in a model where employment by age, education and human capital, and growth, are all endogenous 
is the main contribution of this paper.  
Our simulation results prefer an intelligent PAYG pension system above a fully-funded private system. 
Key elements of an intelligent PAYG system include: (i) a close link between old-age pensions, and 
individual labor earnings and contributions, via a high pension replacement rate, (ii) a high weight of 
labor  income  (i.e.  hours  worked  and  human  capital)  earned  as  an  older  worker  in  the  pension 
assessment base. Pension reform in this direction encourages young individuals to study and build 
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postpone retirement. Strengthening the link between one’s future old-age pension, on the one hand, 
and one’s human capital and labor supply when older, on the other, introduces strong financial 
incentives which may bring about important changes in behavior. Policy reforms in this direction may 
also  raise  welfare  levels of  current  and  (especially)  future  generations.  Furthermore,  our  results 
confirm that the partial abolishment of various early retirement regimes, through a reduction in the 
generosity of early retirement benefits or the introduction of more strict eligibility criteria for early 
retirement,  substantially  stimulates  employment  of  older  workers  along  both  the  intensive  and 
extensive margin. 
Our findings tend to support recent pension reforms in countries like Sweden and Finland. Sweden 
moved from a quite non-actuarial PAYG system to a quasi-actuarial system with individual notional 
accounts (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; OECD, 2005). These accounts establish a close relationship 
between working hours, labor earnings and contributions on the one hand, and future pensions on 
the other,  as  in  the case  of  a  high  replacement  rate  b4a  in our model (and  a  low  b4b).  Finland 
introduced a system where the pension accrual rate rises with age, which corresponds to the case of 
a rising pj as workers get older in our model (OECD, 2005). There is no support in our model for policy 
changes which imply an extension of the pension assessment base to those years when young people 
may optimally be studying.  
 
 
We see various possibilities for future research. First, we assume in this paper a constant population 
structure and life length. The implementation of a birth and mortality rate and uncertain life length, 
is  left  for  future  research.  Second,  we  assume  in  this  paper  homogeneous  individuals  in  each 
generation. The implementation of different ability levels is also left for research in the near future. 
Welfare effects from the policy measures discussed in this paper may be very different for high and 
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Appendix 1: Construction of data and data sources 
 
In this appendix we provide more detail on the construction of some of our performance variables 
and policy variables.  
 
Employment rate in hours (in one of three age groups, 1995-2007) 
Definition: total actual hours worked by individuals in the age group / potential hours worked. 
Actual hours worked = total employment in persons x average hours worked per week x average 
number of weeks worked per year 
Potential hours = total population in the age group x 2080 (where 2080 = 52 weeks per year x 40 
hours per week) 
Data sources:  
* Total employment in the age group / total population in the age group: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics by Sex and Age. Data are available for many age groups, among which 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 
45-49, 50-54, 55-64. We constructed the data for our three age groups as weighted averages. 
* Average hours worked per week: OECD Stat, Labour Force Statistics, Average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job. These data are available only for age groups 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. We use 
the OECD data for the age group 15-24 as a proxy for our age subgroup 20-24, the OECD data for the 
age group 25-54 as a proxy for our age (sub)groups 25-34, 35-49 and 50-54. 
* Average number of weeks worked per year: Due to lack of further detail, we use the same data for 
each age group. The average number of weeks worked per year has been approximated by dividing 
average annual hours actually worked per worker (total employment) by average usual weekly hours 
worked on the main job by all workers (total employment). Data source: OECD Stat, Labour Force 
Statistics, Hours worked. 
 
Education rate of young (age group 20-34, 1995-2006) 
Definition: total hours studied by individuals of age 20-34 / potential hours studied 
As a proxy we have computed the ratio: ( ) 20 34 20 24 25 34 20 34 0 5 0 25 fts . pts . pts / pop - - - - + +  
with:  fts the number of full-time students in the age group 20-34 
           pts the number of part-time students in the age groups 20-24 and 25-34. 
           pop total population of age 20-34 
Full-time students are assumed to spend all their time studying. For part-time students of age 20-24 
we make the assumption (for all countries) that they spend 50% of their time studying, part-time 
students of age 25-34 are assumed to spend 25% of their time studying. Due to the limited number 
of part-time students, these specific weights matter very little.  
Data sources:  
* Full-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes, full-time)  
* Part-time students in age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34: OECD Stat, Education and Training, Students 
enrolled by age (all levels of education, all educational programmes). We subtracted the data for full-
time students from those for ‘full-time and part-time students’.  
Data are available in 1995-2006. However, for many countries (quite) some years are missing. Period 
averages are computed on the basis of all available annual data.  
 
Average effective retirement age (1995-2006) 
Definition: The  average effective  age of  retirement  is  calculated  as  a  weighted  average  of  (net) 
withdrawals from the labor market at different ages over a 5-year period for workers initially aged 40 
and over. 
Data sources: 
* OECD, Ageing and Employment Policies – Statistics on average effective age of retirement 
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Annual real potential per capita GDP growth rate (aggregate, 1995-2007) 
Definition: Annual growth rate of real potential GDP per person of working age 
Data sources:  
* real potential GDP: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, supply block, series GDPVTR. 
*population at working age: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook, labour markets, series 
POPT. 
 
Tax rate on labor income (t1, t2, t3) 
Definition: Total tax wedge, marginal tax rate in %. The data cover personal income taxes, employee 
and employer social security contributions payable on wage earnings and payroll taxes.  
Data source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, Financial and Fiscal Affairs, Taxing Wages, Comparative 
tax rates and benefits (new definition). 
The OECD publishes these tax data for several family and income situations. We computed t1 as the 
average of marginal tax rates for (i) a one-earner married couple at 100% of average earnings (2 
children), (ii) a two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 33 % (2 
children), (iii) a single person at 67% of average earnings (no child) and (iv) a single person at 100% of 
average earnings (no child). We computed t2  and t3 as the average of tax rates for (i) a one-earner 
married couple at 100% of average earnings (2 children), (ii) a two-earner married couple, one at 100% 
of average earnings and the other at 67 % (2 children), (iii) a single person at 100% of average 
earnings (no child) and (iv) a single person at 167% of average earnings (no child). The reported data 
concern 2000-2002. 
 
Net benefit replacement rates (b1, b2, b3a) 
Definition: The data concern net transfers received by long-term unemployed people and include 
social assistance, family benefits and housing benefits in the 60
th month of benefit receipt. They also 
include unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, 
i.e.  if  workers  can  be  structurally  unemployed  for  more  than  five  years  without  losing benefit 
eligibility. The data are expressed in % of after-tax wages. The OECD provides net replacement rates 
for six family situations and three earnings levels. In line with our assumptions for labor tax rates (see 
above), we computed b1 as the average of the net benefit replacement rates for ‘families’ with 
earnings levels corresponding to 67% and 100% of the average worker’s wage (AW). We computed b2 
as the average of the net benefit replacement rates for ‘families’ with earnings levels corresponding 
to 100% and 167% of the average worker’s wage. The reported data are averages for 2001 and 2004. 
We assume b3a to be equal to b2. 
Data source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Data  adjustment:  Original  OECD  data  for  Norway  include  the  so-called  “waiting  benefit” 
(ventestønad), which a person could get after running out of unemployment benefits. Given the 
conditional nature of these “waiting benefits”, they do not match our definition of benefits paid to 
structurally non-employed individuals. We have therefore deducted them from the OECD data in 
earlier years, which led to a reduction of net replacement rates by about 19 percentage points. For 
example,  recipients  should  demonstrate  high  regional  mobility  and  willingness  to  take  a  job 
anywhere in Norway. The “waiting benefit” was terminated in 2008. We thank Tatiana Gordine at the 
OECD for clarifying this issue with us.   
 
Early retirement replacement rates (b3b) 
To calculate our proxy for b3b we have focused on the possibility for older workers in some countries 
to leave the labor market along fairly generous early retirement routes. Duval (2003) and Brandt et al. 
(2005) provide data for the so-called implicit tax rate on continued work for five more years in the 
early retirement route at age 55 and age 60. The idea is as follows. If an individual stops working 
(instead of continuing for five more years), he receives a benefit (early retirement, disability…) and 
no longer pays contributions for his future pension. A potential disadvantage is that he may receive a   38
lower  pension  later,  since  he  contributed  less  during  active  life.  Duval  (2003)  calculated  the 
difference between the present value of the gains and the costs of early retirement, in percent of 
gross earnings before retirement. We use his data as a proxy for the gross benefit replacement rate 
for older workers in the early retirement route. To compute the net benefit replacement rate, we 
assume the same tax rate on early retirement benefits as on unemployment benefits. We call this net 
benefit replacement rate r3. However, these implicit tax rates are only very rough estimates of the 
real incentive to retire embedded in early retirement schemes and are subject to important caveats 
(Duval, 2003). “First, the focus on a single “early retirement route” leaves aside the participation 
effects of a number of other social transfer programs that may actually be  used as early retirement 
devices. Second, the actual strictness of eligibility criteria for these programs is imperfectly reflected 
in  the  calculations.  For  instance,  even  in  those  countries  for  which  it  has  been  assumed  that 
retirement on account of disability is not […] an available option, due to the official strictness of 
eligibility criteria, the share of disability benefit status in non employment actually grew significantly 
during the second half of the 1990s (e.g. Sweden, United States: see OECD 2003e).” (Duval, 2003, p. 
15). In sum, the available implicit tax rates take  into account neither the strictness of eligibility 
criteria nor the presence of alternative social transfer programs that may de facto be used as early 
retirement devices. Our assumption will be that a realistic replacement rate for the early retirement 
route (b3b) will be a weighted average of r3 and b3a, where we take the latter as a proxy for the 
replacement rate in alternative social transfer programs. If r3 > b3a, older workers will aim for the 
official early retirement route, but they may not all meet eligibility criteria and have to fall back on 
alternative programs. If r3 < b3a, workers will aim for the alternative, but again they may not be 
eligible. We propose that b3b = ξb3a + (1-ξ)r3. Underlying the data in Table 4 is the assumption that 
ξ=0.5.  Correlation between b3b and r3 is 0.95. Cross-country differences roughly remain intact. Clearly, 
our results in the main text do not depend in any serious way on this assumption for ξ.  
Data  Source:  OECD,  Tax-Benefit  Models,  www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives,  Duval  (2003), 
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